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The Sino-Philippine
South China Sea Dispute

1

Shelton Woods*
ABSTRACT
On January 23, 2013 the Philippines alerted the international
communit) that it had initiated a case against China in to help resohe the dispute regarding China's continuing mme into the South
China Sea. 'I he body set to hear the case against China is the United
'\ations Convention on the Law of the Sea (lJNCLOS). China's re'>pome \\as presented in a scathing 93-point rebuke of the Philippines. China claims that the Philippines has not followed proper
channels in ll\ing lo resol\'e territorial disputes, and China remains
willing to discuss this al a bilateral level. For their part, Philippine
officials claim that China is bullving its \\'a) into hegemonic control
of the South China Sea. This paper presents a contexlllal understanding of the current situation with an eye toward history as a way
through thb potential geopolitical crisis. Based on precedent in the
area and in world history, I argue in this paper that the Philippine
government's reliance on the IJNCLOS to arbitrate with China in the
South China Sea is a gamble that wi ll result in greater harm than
good for the region. The limited options in how to respond to China
should recalibrate how the Philippine'> should diplomatically move
fornarcl with China.
Keywords: Philippines, l :\CLOS, :\inc Dash Line, ,\SE,\,'\!, Arbitration
I.

I:\TRODlJCTlO~

It '>eems a bit 'ltrange that the Philippines would pick a fight with China.
Yet that is cxactl) hO\\ China and other obsener-. \iew the Philippines' Sinopolicies mer the past two )ears. 2 Tensions between China and the Philippines escalated to the point that in July 20 15 diplomatic sources indicated
that China's President Xi .Jinping may bo)COtt the 'ovember 18, 19 APEC
'ihelton \\'oocb eanH'cl hi> PhD in Southeast Asian hi.,ton frn111 l CLA. Ile is a Professor
of Soulht'<t.'t ,\.,1a11 f h,ton at Boise State L11iven,it1. Ik i' the autho1 ol numerous articles and
book' on Ea't .mcl 'io11tlwa.\t ,\.,ia. lk •pent his fim <'ighlt'l'll ~ear' in the Philippines.
'wood' ~' hm't''t,ltt' .l'du
1 I hi' an irk ,., taken from the re1iewed and echted papn rhat wa' clelhered at the 23rd
,\111111al Confe1entl' on Tal\\an 'imdies, Onober :l. 2015
2 J11lw1 "-11. "lhc Philippine,· l\la_....,11e La1dare Blunder in tht· South China Sea", .\'atzo11al
lntrr11/ t 4 Dec i-mbe1 '.WI I. •nailable at <http:t national111ti-1 est.org fcawre the-philippines111as,i1e-hm la1 t ·blundl'r-the-south-<hina-sea-11837>.
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meeting due to who was hosting the meeting - it met in Manila.:-1 This would
ha\C been the first time in APEC's 2&-)ear history that a leader from one of
the 21 represented economies abstained from participating due to animus
toward the host counll)'. 1 Animus is not too strong a term to use as on June 3,
2015 Philippine President Benigno Aquino compared China's actions in the
South China Sea (SCS) to Nati German} 's actions leading up to World War
II, implicith likening President Xi to Adolph Hitler. \'itriolic commenLs charactcri1cd China's responses to President Aquino's sentiments:' President
Aquino made these statements during a \'isit to Japan-his sixth ,;sit within
foe years to China's East Asian ri\'al. The genesis for the now-public quarrel
between the Philippines and China occurred on January 22, 2013 when the
Philippines issued a Notification and Statement of Claim against China to the
United ations ConYention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The reported
4,000-page -.ubsequent memorial included numerous Philippine complaints
that China's actions in the SCS violate international law. The U 'CLOS chose
to convene a hearing on this matter, appointing a five-person tribunal to
re\iC\\ the Philippine complaint against China. For its pan, China has refused to participate in arbitration, though that has not stopped the UNCLOS
from moving forward \\ith the proceedings. 6
Thi<; article argues that the Philippines' decision to take China to an international court is misguided and an affront to signed accords and unspoken
agreemenLs between the two countries. Following this brief introduction , an
overYiew of Philippine-China historical relations provides a context for the
current crisis. Next, the Philippine case against China is juxtaposed with
China's public position paper on the Philippine complaint. This background , along ";th the case study of.Japan's past actions in the SCS, are the
bases for an argument against the Philippine decision for arbitration. This
article concludes with a review of the Philippines' options in the SCS.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PIIILIPPINE-CHINA RELATIONS

China's aggressive action in the SCS helps to explain President Aquino's
recent overtures to the United States and Japan. The hope is that these multilateral relations \\ill serve as a deterrent to China's aggression. What is a bit
paradoxical in President Aquino's foreign policy decisions is that between
China, Japan, and the Cnited States, onh two of those countries ha\e invaded and caused unspeakable horror to Filipinos. The 1899-1902 Philippine-Ame rican War and Japan 's invasion and '>ubsequent occupation of the
Philippines <luring World War fl caused more human loss than amthing
China has e\er done to the Filipinos. 7
The Philippines was a long-time colon} of Spain (1571-1898) . However,
following the 1898 Spanish-American war, the United States bought the
3 "Xi Jmping 11fay Not Participate in this Year·s Apec Summit", China Times, 17 Jul) 2015.
4 Oa\i d Stotll, "Pl11lipp111e Pn·\ldem Sl am~ Be1png for \cting hke \l;u1s m thi- Somh China
Sea", l ime, 3 June 2015, ;l\'ailahle at <http: f ume.com ' 3906811 / phihppine~-<hma-naLi-ger
man vl>.
:; "Aqumo Sho"' a Lack of St·me or Sl'mih1ht\ ", Chma DmlJ. 5 June 2015, a\-a1lable a l
<http: u\a.ch111adaily.com .cn epaper 2015-06 05 rnnLenL_20921845.htm>.
ti Jay Batongbacal, "Arbitration IOI : Philippine\\'. China", 21 January 2015, Asia ,\fantinu
fra111/l(lret10 /111/rnln.,, .wailahle at <http://am/1.ms.org/nrb1tmllon-I 0 l-ph1l1p/1mt1-v-chmn/>.
7 Bnan \1cAlli~1e1 Linn. TIU' Phillf>Pmt l\"ar, 1899-1 902 (Lawrence: Uni\ e rsit\ Pres.-. o f Kan\ illi, 2000 ); .Jm~ (, Rew\, tr. tl\ Jost' Ga1cia lmua, Tnrori.sm and /Udnnpt1011:Ja/10nese Atront1e1 m the
Philipj1i11tl (Manila: C:omume1 Pre''· 1947)
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Southeast Asian archipelago for 20 million dollars. America remained its colonial mother until 1942 \\hen .Japan invaded and occupied the Philippines.
Afte1 recei\ing independence in 1946, the Philippines was still economicallv and militarih dominated bv the US a<; numerous Anwrican ba::.es, including the large air force base of Clark Field and the strategic naval base of
Subic Bav, c\Ssistecl the cs to maintain iLs paramount militan power in Asia
dming the Cold War.I{ While these bases were acti\e, the United States was
tlw second-leading emplowr in the Philippines.
Suffering from what some call "a colonial hangO\er," nationalist fel'vor in
the post-Ferdinand \1arco'> era led the Philippine legislature to order that all
US bases close by the encl of 1992.' 1 While relations between the two countries remain cordial. there is a deep com-iction b\ man) that America's tenun.· and influence in the PhilipRines were rooted in both O\ert and cloaked
racist assumptiom and actiom. 0
Historians note that the main reason Spain, tJ1e US, and .Japan occupied
the Philippines had e\ef)thing to do with geograph). Spain sought a base
clme to Indonesia 's Spice Islands and a station from which to trade with
China. At the end of the nineteenth century, influential American politicians
wa1 med to Alfred Mahan\ thesis of na\"al priman and the Philippines pro\'icled an ideal spot for America\ expanding empire and n.wy. 1 Japan was
likewise motirntecl b\ its need for open sea lanes to impon oil from the
Dute h E,1st lndie'>. These three colonial mothers promised that Filipinos
would benefit from foreign presence and rule; no netheless, these foreign
powers were part} to widespread abuse on the local population. China, on
th(• oth('J hand, which is closer geographicalh to the Philippines than these
three previous Philippine occupiers, has never sought to colonize the islands.
Trade between China a nd the Philippines dates back scH•ral millennia as
imular Southeast Asia's ea1 h history is defined by trade and navigational expe1 ti<;e of ~1 ala) s.iilor-.. 12 !'he presence and importance of Chinese in the
Philippi1~cs dramatically i~1creased after Spain established its rule on the i~
lands ..\ flw famous ~la111la Galleon trade between the New World and tJ1e
Philippines centered on the exchange of Anwrica's siher for Chinese
goods. 11 Thousand., of Chinese mo\ed to ~fanila and served as brokers for
Chinese finished products; the Spanish evenwally allowed the Chinese to
dominate ~tanila \ econorm. To be sure, resentment toward tJ1c Chinese
H William l· Bern, l '.S. !Ja1t1 111 the l'hi/1/1/1111eJ: IJ11• Et111ltttio11 11( lhe Spmal Uelalumslup (80111
dn \\'estY•n• Pit"•'· 1~IK!I); Ca1hcrn1e Luu ,111d C\llJhia Enloe, /hr Bmts of hnp1rt: !Ju· G/nb11/
Stmi:glt ag1111111 l ".\ \'1/1/m) Poi/.\ ('1·w York ' 'YL Pre''· 2009).
~l Rolando c;,;paldo, "Filipino Philo,oplw A \\c\tcm Tradition on an Eas1e1 Seumg" in
Rolando \l Gripaldo (1·d .) 111' \laking uf 11 Iih/1i110 l'hilowpher a11d other 1::.1 w)1 (Manila: l\;11ional
Book ~lOrt'. 2009).
10 P.ll!l \ . Kr.rnw1 Tilt 8/0<1</ 1if G<rwmmml: Rare, Empire, /ht L niltd Sta/ti, & till' Philippmt\
(Ch.1pc:I I hll : Ll1mer\lt~ of l\onh ( .arohna Ptc\\, 200fi); \"inccnt 1 . Rafael, 117ule l .mit and Othrr
f."t•1·11/1 rn 1'il1p111n Hiilnr\ (Durham Duke l ni\('"il'\ Pot'"· 2000)
11 \\atren Zunmnmann, F11>I Great l numph: How ht•e A111tma111 lllflM th.nr Cnrmtri n World
l'm1•n (l\;t•w York: Farra1 , Str.iu' and Giroux, 2002)
12 l\.t·11h \\ cllcr l ,1\101, -Tht' Larh h.mgdom~· 111 Tht Cm11/md[!! HH/ol) nf So11tlva1t A.sw
hom /•.arl)' limes to C. 1500t·rl. Nicholas Tailing (Cambticlgc: Cambridge Urmcr... it~ Pre''· 1992);
Kt'llllclh R I lall I H11/11f'\ of f .ar/\ \r111thm1t \11a \lnnt1me Trade nntf \orretal Dn•elopmnll, 100-1500
( Lanham: Rowman & l .11tlefklcl, 20 10); ~1 C.. R1tklef..,, t'l al.. 4 Vtw Histnr\ of \outh.nllf A1ia ('\e"
\ork. Palgraw ~l.Kmillan , 2010).
1·1 Jonathan D. Sp1·ncc, /hr .\mrch fm Modern U1111n (New Ym k: Norton, 1990).
l ·l Benno l.t•garcl.1. "Two and ,1 Half ( .t•nturies of 1he (,allcon r racle", Ph1lippmt .\t11tf1e1 Yol
:1, no. I I !1'1'>) . :1.fi..:li2.
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in the Philippin<'s gn.·1\' a., its eronomic and social n<'t\\orks expanded, and then· wen· -.cH·ral brutal ma\sacn·s of Ch111est• c anied out In
combined Spanish and Filipino forces.,., Still, the Chinese found thei1 1\·a1·
not onh mto t•co11om1C' promint·nce but abo 11110 social 11nportancc Elitt
Filipino families allowt'd their daughters to mar fl promirwnt local Chine'-<'
merd1ants and tlwir nwsti70 0£l\p1ing \\ere often the most h1ghh educated
and rulturalh '>ophi\tit.1ted among the incligenom peoples. 1" \1,un of tlw
wealthiest Filtpinm m the t\\ent)-fit.,t ccntun an· pa1 t ChnH·se. 17 Yet. as
noted fu1 ther helcm, China 1w1t·1 sought to conqm·1 all of the Philippinesunlikt' tht· actions of Spain, th e l S, and Japan.
Of course, the past doe' not gua1,rntet• the future. ( hina ma1 change it\
5,000-\eai paut•rn of not set· king conquests acrnss oceans . .\lore hkel), howt.•1e1. if tlwre is a pattern chat \\ill continue 1\ich China it " it., 1dclllit\ ,Ls tht
Midcllc Kingdom to which pt'ripheral states OM' del<'re11cc and n·spen. It i'
this WI) hi:.rorical identlt\ that tht Chine<.<· rek1 to \\hen tht·1 speak of the11
count rv\ national sme1eigntv. For the Chinest', those two wmds-national
so1e1 eignn-are packed \\ith historical nwmon of 1<'gional clomin,111cl'. The
Philippim·., oil\ ioush does not arcept thi<., 1egional paradigm and ha\ tak(•n
its ca'e public 1·ia the <ourts at I he 11.tgut·
III.

TIIE PHII.IPPI NE \ . CI ll~A

C~C.LO~

C.\':>E

On .Ja11uar~ 22, 20U che Peoples Rcµublir of Chin,l (PRC) t•mba''' in
Manila rneiH·d a t'l-pomt '\otific ation and St.itt•me11t of Claim th,ll \\,I\ con
comitantlv suhmittl'd to the l ~( 10~ . Thi' inll'l national organi1a11on .l'sists
in t''>tabh,hing bounda11es and me of resource-; for 'tatt'' that border ocean'
and 'eas. l 1 1\CLO~ ''a' estahli~ll('d in l 9H2, and tht· Philippmes and Chin.1
'>ignccl on as l '\( lOS ,tclht•n•nt' in 1981 .md 200G re'ipt•ctiit:h. \rti< k 27 11
imitt•s parties to submit arbitration 1equt''>ts 11 disputes lit• l\ithin tlw L'\( LO':>", p11r11t·w and clw pa111cs h,ne alreach sought to negotiate a 'eukment
lw11n·e11 them-.ehcs. \ brief and general \llllllllan of the Philippint complamt aga1mt China " prOI 1cled 111 the fom bulletl'd prnnts lwl01\.
•
•

•

•

')ht' l'hil1ppi11t'< "II• •l •.-l.i11~ l '<LO'> to 1k1t·r111111t' \\h1rh 1011llln own' tht' ch.,_
pm1·d 11·11110~ 1h.11 both p•11lit'' cl.um .
( .hi11.1 ha' ii.:11011·cl .111d ,·iol.111·d thl' int1·111,111011.1lh-,.111ctin11l'd 11111·, of 1h1· '.!110 n.1111iral milt· r,d11,iH° Fn1110mic Zo1w to wl11rh t',I( h n11111tn i' e111i1kd. In f,11 t, Ch111a
h.1' rl,unu-d \OH'I 1·ii.:11t\ ow1 1ct'h .11111 "·ll''" th.11 ,11 t' !i'ill 11.111tiral 1111lt'' fl nm l.111d
l>dn11i.:ini.: lo the 1'1·nplt•', Republic of ( .lmu (rath1•1 1ha11 follrn,i11J.: 1111' 11111·1 nation,111\' .1ttq1tl'd '.!00 11111t- li111i1 ).
Chi11a', hl.11.1111 di,1q:;ncl fm ii' m·ii.:hhor' and 111tt·rn.111onal l.11, i' 1·\lclt·n11'CI in 1he
"H·allt-d ni1w-d.1'h lint" map '11hrmt1t·d b• C:hma 10 1h1· l 1111t·cl , ,1111111' 1111 \1,1\ 7.
'.!1109 . .\ccording Jo 1hi' 111.ip, HO pnu·111 nf 1ht '>outh C:l1111.1 '-< .1. i1K ,c1111i:; .111·a, 11·,,
1han :;o n11ln h nm tht• Philippine·'· IH'loni.:' to C h1na .
l'inall\, C:hin.1 h,L, h11ll11'cl 1lw l'l11lipp111t·'· 1t'lll'!;t"d on 111111u.1I ag1t·t·111.-nl\ 10 \\ilhclr;m h 0111 'p1·1·ifir .11 l'a' of di,1111tt', and ro111in11t·\ to claim j,11·1' for i1,1·lf th.II do not
t'H' n qualif~ '" hahit.1hl1'. J.>1

l."i Fcl)(•ll \\'irl.h1•rg, I hr <:111111·11· 111 l'hil1j>/1111r J.1fr, /851>-l.'i!I.\ (Qut·mn: ,\11·11t·o l 1m·c r,it\
P1t·" · IV65).
16 Fclg;11 \\'itl.h1·1 1. · ·11w C:hint·,,,. \l1•,1im 111 l'h1lippi1w l li,tor. • • j<Jumn/ n/ .\ c111thra1/ , \ 11m1
llutory

"'I. t•,

110.

I ( 1!16-1): ti'.!-100.

17 forlir1, "'.!O 15 l'hi lippin1·, · ;,n Ri1 hnt ", ,l\ail.1bk .11 < hup: / /\nm .fo1 ht·,.c 0111 / pl11lippinnhillionai1 t·' / li,1 / #1.1h:m t•1,1ll >.
IH Cm1·m1111·11t ol th1 Phihppi11t•,, ":'\011fk,111on and '>1 111'1111'111 nl C:l.lim of tht• l'hilippi111·'
in 1he \\'i·,1 l'hilipp1nt '-<..1. '.l o lan11.tr~ '.!Ol:I, ,l\,11lahl1 .11 http:' ''"'' d11cagopci.:.c·o111 , p10:!·
1:1.pdf>.
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Embedded in the Philippines' case agaimt China are numernus ~pecific
examples that are fleshed out in the lengthy follm,-up memorial submitted to
the C~CLOS on \Iarc.h 30, 2014.
Though China exercised its prerogative lo not panicipatc in the GJ\'CLOS proceedings, it did release a position paper on December 7, 201-1 in
which it outlined the reasons why the Philippine case lacked merit. The tone
of China's unoffi cial response i~ more strident than the initial complaint submitted by the Philippines. Some of the more poignant points made 111
China's response include the following:
lht.• \t.'J> t'>,,ence o f the Philippine case is about who owm the di,,p11tnl tenitory.
rhat dispute is beyond the purview of the LN'CLOS.
1 he Philippine> is haKgling O\er a few disp111ed tt'nitorics r<llher than discuSl>illg the
over,1ll 111a11e1 of China\ SCS polrc}- To fii..<tle 011.JllSt ,1 few .irea.s of dI'1m1e rather
than tht.• much larger iSllue i> co11n1erproducti\t:.
Ch111a d,ums mdrsputable so,erergntv O\er ten non rnsrdt: rh nirw-da,h lint' SC'..S
map. It b not the role of the UNCLOS 10 dt'termine whl'lhe1 or not China ha> a right
lo thr., SU, regron.
In ronncnion with th<' above, China and the Plulippint:s ha\e a long-.,tanding agreemellt io rt·sohe thrs dispute through friend(\ and resp<•nful chalogue. :\umerous examples n ·gard rng this include:
• \n Auhru;t 10. 199'\ joint st.atemem noted that both 'idt's .igrt't' 1ha1 ". .disputes
shall ht• seulecl in a peaceful and friendh manner through comultatiom on the
ha..-1' of equillit:) and munral re<.pect "
• A .\laJC'h 23, 1999joim ,ratement of the China-Philipp111e' Expnt Group meeting
note<;," ... lhe understanding to cominut' to work for a seulenwn1 of Lheir di!Ter1·nce through frit"ndly consultat.iom [and that) tht t\\o SJdes bt'lieH· that tJ1e
chanrwl~ of romt1lt.aliuns between China and till' Pl11l1pp111t:s are unob:.tructed.
rhe1 haw agre<·d that the dispute should bl" p1·act.'111lh set1led lhro ugh
rons11l1a1io11."
• \joi111 statt.·ment on .\la\' 16. 2000 wherl" both partit'' agn·ed to pursue peaceful
11ego1ialions reg<11cling SCS territory.
• rhe \pril .J, 2001 joi11t st.atemenl where "The two sides JJOl('d that the bilateral
1 omultation me1 hani"11 to ei..plon· wa}·s of cooperat1011 in the 'il>uth China Sea
has bt·t.•n eflecti\ t' "
• I he '\member I, 2002 Declarat.ion on the C.ond11n ( DOC:) of parties in the
'>outh Chi11.1 Sea bet\\t·en the Association oJ SoutJw;L,t Asian 1\,uiom (ASEA.'1)
and the PRC that included the statement "l he Par ties concenwd unclenake 10
1esolvl' tht·11· terri1orial and JUrisdkuonal disputes b} peat t'lul meam ... thrnugh
friend!\ comuh;uions and m•gotiatioru. b' !>0\1·tt•ign 'tale' clireuh concerned. in
accorclanct· with uni\it'I'>all} 1ecogrn1ed principles ot 111te111auo11;1J la''· mcluding
1he 1'182 t '\ Comemion on the L-1w oJ the "i!·a."
On !'>eptember ·1. 200.J dunng Phrlippme P1t·siden1 Glona .\l,1,·apagal-Arroyo·,
sia1t ,·i~it lO China ajoim press stalement included the followinir "[Tht' PRC and
the Phihpp111es agree I that the earl1 and ,;gtH ous 11npll'111entat1on of the 2002
\SF. \'\1-Chma Dl'dara1ion on tJ1e Cond11n oJ l'arlit·s in tht· S0t11h China Sea will
pa•c.: the \\a)' for I.ht: tran,fonnat1on of the South China Sea imo .Ill an·a of
COOjll'J'atio11."
• During Phrhppirw Pn·s1den1 Benigno S \quinn's :\uh'llSL 30 lO Sqllemhcr 3, 2011
stalt· visit IO Chiu<1, a joint statenwm reaffirm1•d UH' lJOC. \ agr 1·1·men1 for peaceful rwgotiation of SC<; dispu1es.
Pl'rhaps 111011· 11npuna11LI) for the cw rem rnsis rs that the ar brtrauon ducuml·nt include' ;111 aswr tion that 1he PRC and the Philippines haH· be1•11 trying to negotiate an
11nclen.1.u1dmg regarding cl1sputed SCS bur ders .md tt·rn1<>11t.·s. 1 his is nm uue. A'
China note... "But the truth is that tJw two rounu ie:. h,l\e nnt·r engaged in negot.iatiom \\Ith regard to the subjen-mauer of the [ L'\C:L.OS) arbitration." In China';
opinion, while both panit·., agn·ed to approach the maltt'r Ill ,1 friendh and peaceful
mannt·r re<1I tall..l> on i.uhstanti\e iS>ut·s hd\e \el to tal-t• plact'. Furthermore, China
h<1s acurall} sought to est<iblish ""Chma-Phrlippnwi. rt•gular consuhat.ion mechanism
on manumt· t-.SUt''· To date. there hai. nt'\C:'r bt'en ;my n·sponw from the
Philippnw' -

•
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Finallh China has made it clear that 11 will not abide b~ the L '\CLOS conclusions
regarding the SCS dispute:
.
On 25 August 2006, China deposited, pur~uant to Article 298 of tll{' Convention, with
Secretary-General of the United Natiom a written declaration, stating that, ''The Gmemment of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the procedure~
provided for in section 2 of Pan XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph I (a) , (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the
Comention." In other wordl., as regards [to] di,putes concerning maritime delimitation, historic bays or titles, military and law enforcement acti\illes, and di,putes in
respect of which the Security Council of the United :--lat.ions is exercising the functions assigned to it bv the Charter of the lJnited Nations, the Chinese Government
does not accept am of the compulSOI) dispute settlement procedures laid do\'n in
section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, including compulsorv arbitration. China
firm I} believes that the most effecti\e means for settlement of maritime dispmes between China and its neighboring States is that of friendh consultations and negotia1
tions between the sovereign States directly concerned. \l

Philippine officials responded to China's position paper by claiming that
China has bullied its way into waters and land that are under Philippine jurisdiction. Furthermore, when the Philippines and China make agreements,
such as an agreement to withdraw from Scarborough Shoal, China reneges
on its agreement and returns in force. 2 Filipino leaders asked: How do you
negotiate with an entity that disregards basic international norms? How do
you talk to someone who says that ancient maps along with a 1948 map
presented to the UN affirms that the SCS belongs to China and all negotiations must begin with that presupposition? Finally, in the midst of so-called
peaceful talks, China continues to blatantly strengthen its position in the
SCS. For example, China's massive building campaign on Fiery Cross Reef
now includes the largest landing strip in the SCS and the only one that allows
for the landing of four types of aircraft: cargo, sun·eillance, fighter, and
bombers. This 3,000 meter landing strip is substantially longer than the next
largest SCS airstrip of Malaysia's 1,368 meter strip on Shallow Reef. 21
The Philippines, for various reasons, however, should tread lightly in this
situation. In terms of military might, the Philippines is ranked 40th-just
above Nigeria-in the world's countries ofmilital) strength; China is third. 22
A recent assessment of the Philippine Air Force notes, "Unfortunately, the
Philippine Air Force is a shadow of the organization that the U.S. helped
build up after Vietnam. Despite a 20-year-old modernization plan, the Philippine Air Force lost its ability to operate jet fighters ten years ago and suffers
from aging equipment, poor infrastructure, an ad hoc military procurement
system and poor morale. In effect, the PAF is an internal security force and
the Philippines is entirely dependent on the U.S. for external defense."23
Losing face is also an important aspect for the relations between China and
the Philippines. Taking China to a global court is opening this difficult simation to the entire world. If China refuses to abide by the UNCLOS decision,

°

19 Go\ernment of the People's Republic of China Mini'tf} of Foreign Affairs, "Position
Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Mam·r of judsdiction in the
South China Sea Arbitration Initiated b)' the Republic of the Philippines", i D!'cember 2014,
available at <http: www.fmprc.go\'.Cn mfa_eng. zxxx .662805 t121i147.shtml>.
20 Philippines, "Notification and Statement".
21 Asia Maritime Tramparency Initiative, "Airpower in the South China Sea" , (2015), available at <http: / amti.csis.org airstrips-scs/>.
22 Global Fire Power, "Countries Ranked by Military Strength", (2015), a\ailable at <http: /
/ www.globalfirepower.com / countries-listing.asp>.
23 Michael W. Pietrncha, "Regaining the lnitiati\e in the South China Sea", Tlv Diplomnt, 5
August 2015, available at <hup: thediplomat.com 2015 08, regaining-the-in11iative-in-thesouth-china-;ea/>.
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what options does Lhe Philippines have in response to China's blatant encroachment on waters and reefs close to Luzon and Palawan? Why might the
Philippines have overplayed its hand in its UNCLOS arbitralion complaint
against China?
IV.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENT AND REl.AISM

In publicly castigating China's move into the SCS, President Aquino
noted, 'Tm an amaleur student of history and I'm reminded of, just watching
several documentaries on World War II, especially how Germany was testing
the waters and what the response was by various other European powers... .They tested the waters and what the response was by various other
European powers. They tested the waters and they were ready to back down
if, for instance in that aspect, France said stop. But unfortunately, up to the
annexation of the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia ... the annexation of the
entire country of Czechoslovakia, nobody said stop. The commentators on
these documentaries were saying what if somebody [had] said 'stop' to
(Adolf) Hitler at that point in time, or to Germany at that time, could we
have avoided World War II? That is a question that still occupies the thoughts
of so many individuals."24
Perhaps the most accurate statemenl in the above quote is that President
Aquino is an amateur student of history. No one who studies history should
be surprised by China's move into the SGS. Part and parcel of a rising superpower is the extension of its hegemonic borders. From the ancient Persian,
Greek and Roman empires to the more recent Spanish, British, and American empires, there is not one example from the above list where a dramatic
increase in economic and military affluence did not translate into the state
flexing its hegemonic and colonial muscles at the expense of weaker states. If
this is the case in every historical scenario of an emerging superpower, why
should China have to play by different rules? One might answer that question
by saying that international policies have changed so China must play by
these new rules. That notion echoes back to the somewhat unbridled optimism of the post-Darwinian nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where
the idea that social progress and modernity had curbed the darker side of
human nature. The two world wars and the anemic League of Nations and
the United Nations should disabuse anyone of this optimistic opinion of a
species gaining ground on global peace.
V.

A CASE STUDY OF SGS HEGEMONY

We do not have to study ancient or modem Western empires to understand China's move into the SGS because there is a recent scenario to draw
upon . Coming out of more than two centuries of self-imposed isolation, Meiji
Japan's (1868-1912) policy-makers set the course to make their decentralized,
feudal country economically rich and militarily strong. 25 Meij i officials
changed their country's economic patterns, government structure, education
curriculum, and military system. With regard to the latter change, the samu24 Masaaki and Riji Yoshida Kameda, "China is Acting like Nazi Cennan}. says Philippines'
Aquino", TM japan T'illus, 3 June 2015, a\'ailable at <http://wwwJapantimes.cojp news/ 2015/
06/03/ national/politics-diplomacy/c hina-is-acting-like-na1i-gennany-sa~'S-philippines-aquino/#.

VjE3K7erRhF>.
25 Marius B. J ansen, '/11e £nU'Tgence of Meiji japan (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995).
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1ai class \\a'> replaced b\ uni\ersal conscriplio11 and as one scholar noted,
"Having abolished the samurai class, .J.l1Mn needed a n,\lion of s.1111urai.":.?h
Meiji officials assumed that \\'esLern powers would \H·konw an ind usu iali1ecl .\sian councr;, i11Lo the club of 111oclernit\. I hac opti111is111 was reflecled in
Fukulawa Yukichi\ admiraLion for modern We.,cern 1111peri,\I pm,ers. He
noted in 1860, \\<•stern nalions ·· ... Leafh and learn from each other, pra\ for
each other\ welfare, and ,\ssoci,\te wlCh each other in arronlance wilh the
laws of nature and rnan.":.? 7 Bul it did not take long for the Japanese Lo realile modern in did not erase prejudice. \\ricing t\\ency \('.\!~ later, Fuku~awa
noted that "... the world operated according to the law of the jt1n11:Je:·.?H
Concomitant with Japan's meteoric economic and milican rise wa-, its
dominance and 011trighL annexation of '>trrrounding H'nilorie'> including,
the Kuril and Rn1kw island chaim, Tai\\an, and Korea. Its ju~1ification for
these actions \\as twofold: Japan wa'> intent on lifting iL'> neighbors into more
ad,anced ci' iliLation and prosperit\, and Japan needed buffers between potential ri\ab such as Russia. In tnnh, Japan's acquisition of colonies " ·a s k·ss
blatant than the \\!estern natiom that caned up the world and had colonies
10,000 miles m'a' from the moLherland . .\t the turn of the twentieth centun,
these colonies included JO of the l I mode1 n Southeast Asia countries. \Vhat
is most instrnctive for Lhe current situation in the SCS is <I n•\i<''' of Japan's
progression from it., peaceful mo\t• into Lt'>t and Southeast \si.1 to a more
confrontational approach.
World War I created a militan and economic \acuum in \..,ia. \\'e\t<·rn
po,,er-, were caught in a three-vea1 blood\ .,talemate in Emope which pro'ided Japan with an opponunil) to ei..tend its grnwing 1110uence. During
World War I, Japan\ econom} grt'\' I>\ 10 percent and it., industrial output
grew b\ more than 70 percent. In I ~ll :~ th<:H' were 11,000 Jtpane.,e in Southeast Asia; b\ the earh 1920~ that had more than doubled to 23,000. Betwecn
1913 and 192'.~ ex pons from Japan to Southea<;t Asia i nneased eightfold
while impori... from Southeast ~ia to Japan increased fo efolcl. ;?q
Japan peacefulh entered the Southeast \sian markeLs and quickh dominated chem. I lowe\e1 , after \\'orld \\,u· I <md the ... ub-;egul'llt Great DepH"r
sion, \'\·e~tern states enacted protecuonist policies to curb .Japan\ economic
activities in the SCS. '\o Japan\ frn<,t1 ation with being <'ronomi< alh hamstrung in the SCS b\ distant Western powers was noted in chi., 19'.3 1 statement
b\ ~agaoka Shun 'ichi, a Japanese official on trade nego11atiom. lie responded to the Dutch authorities placing limits on .Japanes<' trade with these
thoughts:
.J.ipant''l' p1oduth. hoth 111 tenn' of q11.1ht' and prices. are tht· m<"t '11i1ahll' for 1he
genaal publil' 111 thl' Dut[h l•.a'l lndil'\.
Japan .md thl' Dutt h E.t,1 lndin ;ue inseparably connectt.'d h) natur.il l<m ... .'l lw1dme. I would ha'l' to'·" th;11 ll"\ing to 'l"\C1
26 \larius B. Ja11>en, I ht Afak111g of .\1odm1 J11p1111 ({ ..1mbricl~t· Bl'lknap Prt'" of I lal"\a1 cl
l1mers11i Pre>>, 2000). p. :~ml.
27 .Jame•<, ( \kClain, /apa11, a .\l1H/m1 H1111111 ('\t''' \<>1k· \\' \\ '\orton &: Co., WO~) . p. 2!1~.
28 /bu/. p. :!'I·~.
29 Sh11ni111 I l.1111ne, "Japane\e Eco11omi1 l't·1wtration rnto 'ioutht•a,1 hi.1 and tlw ''iouth""rd Expan,ion· '>< hool of fhought", in bttrmatumal Commr-1111/ H• rir) 111 \, 11'h•a11 ·II a 111 //ii'
/11/nwar Pmod ed '>11.\..1 '>u11:1u.11na and "\lilag10' <.. CtH'fll'IO '\e" 11.tH'll; \tit '-outlwa't ..\.",l
'>tudie:.. 19!14) l l-·\<1
30 Ian Brown, .. lht' Bnt"h \len h.1111 Co111mt111ll\ 111 'i1ngapo1<· ;md .l•t)Mnt''l' (.omml'rti.11
i''l.pansion Ill the l!l"llh", 111 lutrmn/101111/ C<J11ww1twl Hn•rr/ri 11, \ 0111/1111\/ ,'\1111 1 th /u/mMr Pmod
t•d 'i1ma '>11g1uama and ~Iil.1~rn' C. C.unn.•ro (;-.n, 1la\l'n : \ale '><>utht·a,t '·"·' S1ud1t''· 199·1):
111 l'.32.
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thi> natural rel.111omhip i' lil..e di,olx·)ing the ordl'r of (,od.
If.Japant·\e go()(l, imJl.lirt"d tht" "elf.ill· and pr"'peritY of tht' Dutch East Ind1e~.Japan would not he>it<llt' to
gl\t> chit· rnmicln.111011 to tht\ matte1
..I bcliew that ht·causej.ipan'> trail·hla1ing clc·\elopm<•nt of untapped land'> and thC' innC'a.'>t' in the numbt'r of.Japane~e \l10p\ are bt·ing
.1ppret 1,1tecl b' the md1genou~ pt'Oplt·. thi\ mC'<UlS that the .Japane..e are bt·mg welcomt·d
ll\ tht goH·1al publit in Liu Ea\I Indin. 31

In East Asia, Japan's sJm, and stead) mo\e into Manchuria culminated with
the creation of \tanchuJ..uo in 1932. LiJ..e the Philippine~· recent appeal to an
inte1 national organi1ation, China appealed to the League of Nations for international support agaimtJapan 's actiom in Manchuria. Japan's response to
a 10-1-1 rnte against its \fanchuria policies was to walk out of the League.
FiH' \ears later the nation that brought the case to the League experienced
the full fu11 ofJapan 's Imperial armed forces. Japanese atlitude~ coward what
th<'\ comidcred unfair and hypocritical international condemnation of its
hegemonic expansion \\<ts not contrition but a greate1 rigidit\ of their national polity also known as the kokuta('>'.!.
,\ careful reflection re\eals that there are similarities betwt'en the meteoric rise of \te~ji (1868-1912), laisho (1912-1926), and Showa (1926-1989)
Japan and the more recent dramatic growth of China. If neighboring counuies and international organizations tn to stifle what China strongh believes
is its hi'>torical and legal position in the South China Sea, it will respond the
wa' past rising superpowers haw-with a greater determination to prove its
righteom pmition.
VJ.

POLICY OPTIONS FOR T I IE PHILIPPI. ES

There is a significant siln'r lining in the current potential CTisis and one
that should hme made the Philippines think twice before making a public
cast' against China. LlnliJ..e Japan, the L1 nited States, France, Great Britain,
and ocher pa'>t g1 eat powers, China's long hiscon is not defined b\ crossing
oceans to fight lesse1 states and create colo nies. For more than 5,000 years,
China has \et to send its mn> to other lands in order to incorporate more
people into its empire. \ \'bile China's na\'al battles in \'iecnam ma) be an
exception to this rule, one must remember that for mo re than a chomand
Years Vietnam was a prmince of China and geographicalh-attached to the
\fiddle Kingdom. Fn'n when China dominated ocean tra\el du1 ing the .Ming
D~nasry, the seven \.oyages by its massive fleets were not primarih intended
fo1 making war and conquering weaker states.~'.i
\t present, China does not want to invade and or colonize an~ Southeast
Asian• tale. China does not want a war with any of the claimants of the SCS. It
does not \\,mt to test its mettle of its rapidly moderniLinr navv-unlike Japan's desire to do M> in the 1894-I 895 Sino-Japan War. i Rathet, China is
sening notice that its new superpower status brings with it a return to its
regional dominance. If this is the pattern of all past super powers, to Sa} the
rules han• changed for China is, in China's e'itimation, \Hong.
So, should the Philippines just roll O\'er and let China take whatever it
wants in the SCS? In truth, the Philippines does not ha\e to simph acquiesce
:11 Ilajilllt'. ".Jdpant'\l' Ernnomir Penetiation", p. 25.
'12 \\.G. lk<L'>ln. 1//t Rist uf \111dmtjapa11 (:-;e" Yori... St. \larun·, Pie~\. 1990).
ti l.out~l l e\athe~ l\7in1 Chma Ru/rd thr 'im1 /'hr Frm111rt 111'et of tltr Dmf.(011 lhro111 I lO'l14'.tl ('\t·\\ Yori... Simon K: SclnMt'l, 199-1).
l-1 '>.C.:-1 Paine, '/ht Srno·Ja/Hmtse \\tu u/ 189.J 1895.· Pn11ptwm. 1'11wn, a11d l'mnact ('\e\\
\"011... C..1mlmclgl' l ' ni\t'l\tl\ Pn:">. :!003)
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to China: it has other options. For example, it should pursue clande'\tine
bilateral talk~ with China. These negotiations should be somewhat private as
public debates pla\ed out in the media lead to widesprt•ad anger and protests. Philippine negotiators should also approach the talk.s knowing what
China does and does not seek in the SCS.
With such a checkered history of exper-iencing out'>ide exploitation, there
is good 1eamn for Filipinos to fear the next hegemonic power. One can imagine that after the Spanish, American, and .Japanese incursions, Filipinos
would be war) of China's encroachment. But China's mo\e into the SCS actually represents an opportunity for the Philippines. Based on the cruel lessons
from the past and the blood spilt from Magellan to Yamashita, there is no
reason for the Filipinos to remain amateur hbtorians.
\ 'II.

ASEA.'\; AS A.'\; OPTIO:-.J

The Philippines is not alone in facing China\ move into the SCS. Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia have similar complaints regarding China's SCS
aggression, though no other ASE.A.'\; member has brought a case to the UNCLOS against China. In that sense, the Philippines is on its own in terms of
tr} ing to stand up to China. 'either bilateral nor unilateral agreements ha\·e
enough specificit\ to warrant any securit\- for the Philippines .
.\1ultiple rnices have called for ASEA:-.0 to dc,elop an agreement and
speak with one \Oice in response to China's SCS actiYities. Not surprisingly,
President Aquino has championed this cause. At the 2013 Brnnei-hosted
ASE.Ai'\ conference the Philippine president called for consensus in standing
up to China's illegal acthities. It is not just Filipino fishermen who are being
chased off by China's nascent build-up in the region; Vietnamese and Malaysian fohermen also complain about losing access to traditional fishing spots.
The Philippines, howe\'er, should not depend on ASE.A.'\; in its Sino dispute. There are manv humanitarian projects that ASEAN champions, and the
various countries' cooperation in providing aid to tsunami and tvphoon \'ictims is impressive. But each ASE.Ai"! member must consider its support for a
poliC) directed against China's SCS claims with the desire for continued positiw relations with Asia's dominant power. Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand for
example ha\e much more to lose (in immediate t<·m1s) in angering China
over the SCS than in insisting China tear down its newh constructed infrastructures in the SCS. Furthermore, ASEAN's decisions are only appro\'ed
and implemented with a consensus vote. It is high!) unlike!) that every Southeast Asian state \\~II sign off on the Philippines' insistence that China withdraw from the archipelago's exclusive economic lOnc area. 3 "' Even in the
current Philippine UNCLOS case, the onl) ASEAN counu-y to indicate any
support for the plaintiff is Vietnam and it has done :,o rather quietly. An
expert on the Philippine-China SCS dispute noted, "As the December 15
deadline for China to submit a counter-memorial in the CN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Annex \'II arbitration case launched b} the
Philippines passed , the more significant and unexpected development
turned out to he Vietnam's discreet submission of <l formal ::.tatement to the
tribunal. The South China .Homing Post repons that \'ietnam asked the tribunal to giw due regard to Vietnam's legal rights and interests that may be
:\5 '>helclo n \\ Simon , "The L'S Rehalann · ancl So utht"t't ,\\ia" . .~ 1ra11 .\ un·ii. vo l. ;)5, no. 3
( 20l [l ) . '>i2-:)!l5.
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affecled b} the arbilration."% Thi., act was aho described as one where Vietnam "At the same time, quietly submitted a confidential statemenl to the
Tribunal regarding the case.":-17 M>EAN is an important and health) organization but it is not a unilateral group that will defend the Philippines in iL'>
dispute with China.
\'II.

US SUPPORT AS AN OPTION

While some describe the foreign policv of former Philippine President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as one favoring closet relations with Be\jing, Professor Renato Cn11 De Ca<>tro notes Lhat "· [a]s a close neighbor of China, the
Philippines has not ve t total!} trusted Beijing, and Manila still consider.,
Washington as the least dangerous among the big powers, the best balancer,
and Lhe most reliable insurance against an emerging China ... .'[The] CS is
the sole strategic partner of the Philippines', signaling a gradual path back
into the L'S sphere of influence after;ears of drifting toward China during
the previous Arroyo administration."3
Of all the bilateral support options for the Philippines, the L'S makes the
most sense. Even with the enormous US budgel deficit, its national debt, and
political gridlock in Washington, the US accounts for 48 percent of the
world's defense spending; China spends 8 percent. In 2012 the L'S Pacific
Command included six aircraft carrier groups, 180 ships, and 1,500 aircraft
along '"ith 100,000 troops. In five }ears 60 percent of the L'S Na'') will be in
the Pacific theatre. 39 Added to this milita11· mighL is Lhe L'S economic foundational principle of free trade and open access to ocean and sea lanes. The
5.3 trillion dollan. of trade that annually passes through Lhe SCS is the proYerbial rising tide that lifts all ships. 40 The US has the capacity and motivation to make sure that the SCS remains accessible to global trading. EYen
before the submission of the Philippine arbitralion document, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted that the L'S would work to protect the
freedom for all to use the SCS shipping route. Shortt} after making that statement the US sened notice lhat its global interests and attention was pivoting
toward the Pacific in what is no'' being referred lo as a rebalance of CS
global focus. 41
In a recent article Sheldon Simon noted, "Bv 2013, the Cnited States had
identified six strategic partners. Singapore probabl} tops the list, though it
has no formal defense treat\ with the United States.. e\ertheless, it is the
state where Washington has deployed its latest Pacific Fleel vessel , the littoral
combat ship. ~ext came the Philippines and Thailand, ,,;lh which \'\'ashington has formal defense commitments; then Indonesia, Mala)sia, and Vietnam, with which Washington is developing strategic partnerships-an
36 j a\ Batongb<1cal, "Viemam's Impart on the Philippine-, China Arb11rat1on: \ Clo;e1
Look". 18 December 2014, <hup: rngitasia.com ,;etnam.,.impact·<m-1lw-philipp111e.,rhi11<1-<1rb1
ir.iuon-a·do<.t'r-looJ.. >.
37 Bato ngbacal, "Arbitration I 01 ".
38 Zhao Hong. "Chrna-Phihppme<, Relatiom Sumtt•d b' tht' '>outh Cl11na ~ea Dl<,pute".
Forging a \nu Ph1ll1'Jm1e l-ornf;11 l'uluy, 2H \larch 201 ·~. a\a1lablt· at http: ph1hppine'>ill
theworld.org ?q=node / 2145>.
39 Simon, "The l S Rt.>balanct'"
40 Frederick P<ti , "Tt•rritorial Di>pute\ 111 th<' South China Sea-. Vato \ 111•na/w11 uf <:t11111da.
5 \Id' 2014, arnilabk <tl <ht1p. na1oas.'>tKiauon.<.1 1en;t o rial-dl'>ptlle.,·in -1 he-.,ottth-<h111a-~t'a '>.
41 Hill.m Clinton, -.\merica\ Pacifir <.entun". Furngn Polrry. \OI. IH9, nu. I (20 11 ) 56-ti:t
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expression of '>ecurit) importance for both sides <;omewlMt short of a formal
commitment. n·l:Z
Of all thest' partners. It is the Philippines that has responded mmt farnrably to ofTe1~ of CS assistance. President Obama's April 2014 \isit to the Philippines \\aS, in part, to C('lebrate the recentlv concluded Enhanced D('fcm<'
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). 11 A prO\ision in the EDCA 111cludes building facilitie~ for US militat)' personnel and equipmenc \\lthin l'hilippint• ba
ses. Filipinos would han· open access to these LS upponed area., ''Hhin tht·
Philippine bases. American croops will rotate through these insu.1llations as
the) do in similar circumstances in Australia.
Despite the seeminglv positi\'e aspects of the lJS presence in the SC..~ and
its foste1;ng partne1 'ihips, the Philippines cannot entrmt its '>ecunty to the
US. Domesticallv, man) Filipinos remain distrustful and .1mbivalent toward
the LS. Multiple pt·titions were filed with the Philippine Sup• eme Co111 t to
nullif\ the EDCA. 1 his pla,ed out publicly with the Supreme Comt trt'ating
the bilateial agreement like a hot potato. The majoiil) of th(' ju !Ices rnlecl
that EDCA's legitima0 should be dete1·mined b\ the Philippine enate not
the Philippine Supn·me Colli t.
Final!\, and mmt importantly, like China, the VS does not want a ''ar in
the omh China Sea. For this reason the US is clear in all its interanions with
the Philippines that it will not guaralllee an alliance with the arc hipt•lago
nation should it get into a war with China. As Pacific Command Admiral
Locklear noted at tl1e 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue, kW<' don't take sides, hut we
ha\e an interest. ... On the issue of SO\Creignt~ ... maintaining the -.tatu\ quo
b \Cl) important." 11 Diplomacy is Lhe weapon of choice f01 the L'S in the
SCS. China's trade with other Asian nations is largt•r tlrnn its trade \\ith the
CS and so its stake rn the SCS is not only rooted in national and historical
pride, but also in ih some,d1at fragile econo1m .4 .... \1ore0Ye1, Amt-rica 's recent spotl) record of military engagements (Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghani.,tan)
and continued domestic crises also temper its enthusiasm for a cro-.-.-0n·anic
wa1.
VIII.

CONCLUSIO '

With little hope that China will abide by whate\er L ;-.JCLOS ckcides on
the Philippine arbitration case, and '"ith no solid bilateral or unilatt•ral backing, the Philippine., should rethink. its decision to publicl) force China to
clarif) its position and it'> intentions in the SCS. As the Di~tinguishccl Prnfe~
sor of Constitutional Law, Julian Ku noted, "... the Philippines' effort to
force China to accept a1 bitration 11ow b doomed to fail and will probablr
baddire. The Philippines '"ill be in 110 stronger position v1\-a-,is China than it
was befo1e the arbitration, even if it wins an award. Meanwhile, the on·rall
credibilir. and effecti\ene~s of the C:'.\/CLOS dispute resolution system will bl·
called into que~cion. And the U.S. goal of a China that 'abide'>. b\ and n•inforce~· international law and norms will be e\en fanhe1 off.~ 1" Ch ma·.., un
wt'lcome incur\ion into Philippine waters p1 esents oppo1 tunities a., much a.,
42 Simon "The l)<; Rebalance," p . 579.
4:\ Jonathan Marcu~. "Ob.una in 1\sia: \tilitaf) Deal Tops Philippint• Agenda", HllC Xtw•. 2H
\p11l 201 1
.J.1 Simon, ··1 he L'S Rebal.mn•".
43 Ibid., p. S!lO.
4tl Ku. • fhe l'hihppines' \la.,,iH•"
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challenges. In its colonial experience, the Philippines were unable to stave
off eventual domination by the Spanish, Americans and Japanese. Perhaps a
more nuanced response to the latest dominant power in the region ,,;11 end
with much better result~ than those of the past.

